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Abstract 
 
Land grabbing usually refers to the controversial acquisition of a piece of land. As such it is a 
social concept. It deals with social and cultural use of and access to land, and with land tenure, 
including customary and legal rights. If we accept this definition, land grabbing cannot apply to a 
piece of land free of legitimate claim. However, projects associated with large-scale 
deforestation are often qualified as land grabs, without any reference to the social characteristics 
of the land and the project. The concept has been used since 2000 to target foreign investments in 
developing countries in agriculture, forestry, mining or infrastructure sectors. Can large-scale 
land acquisitions be analyzed within the land grab framework? Several indicators were selected 
and applied to a large sample of agro-industrial concessions in Cameroon, Gabon, DRC and RC. 
These indicators include historical occupation of land, customary rights, legal land tenure status, 
Free Prior and Informed Consent. There have been several periods of important investments in 
Central Africa which have affected land tenure, access and use in various manners. But 
agribusiness companies are not the only stakeholders competing for land and national elites 
should not be overlooked. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Central Africa hosts the second largest rainforest massif in the world after the Amazon (Mayaux et al. 
1998), and is the natural habitat of a rich biodiversity. These forests have been relatively well preserved 
up to recent times, thanks to low demographic pressure, limited accessibility, poor infrastructure, low 
impact logging practices and rural exodus (Burgess et al. 2006; Megevand 2013). Large-scale investments 
in land are not new in the region, the first large-scale agro-industrial plantations dating back to colonial 
times (Feintrenie 2014). More recently, the rush for farmland and non-renewable natural resources such 
as metals or fossil fuels (oil and coal) has driven a flow of foreign investments to the region, where 
concessions have been negotiated by the national governments at an increasing speed since 2000 
(Deininger et al. 2011; Anseeuw et al. 2012). As a consequence local people are in direct competition 
with other categories of actors to access land (Cotula et al. 2009).  
Large scale land based investments in Central Africa include individual ownership of several hundred 
hectares of land up to agro-industrial plantations covering several hundred thousand hectares. Domestic 
and international companies as well as national elites invest in agricultural land to produce food crops 
including sugar cane and palm oil for the domestic market, or cash crops like rubber, cocoa or coffee for 
export. Some companies also invest in timber plantations for carbon sink purposes, targeting the 
international free carbon market, or for fuel-wood and charcoal production. 
Land grabbing refers to the controversial acquisition of a large piece of land. The concept has been used 
since 2000 to qualify foreign investments in developing countries in agriculture, forestry, mining or 
infrastructure (like dam) sectors. Land grabbing, in a word to word definition is the action to seize land, 
or deliberately take hold of land. The verb ‘grab’, in the informal register, might also include a notion of 
quick consumption of something. In the case of land grabbing this notion would translate into 
unsustainable use of the land grabbed. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) limits land grabbing to large-scale land acquisitions by foreign investors, and weakening food 
security in the host country (Cotula et al. 2009), considering large-scale land deals – whether purchase, 
lease or other – of more than 1000 ha. This definition doesn’t cover land acquisitions by domestic 
investors, be they companies, governments or individuals. It also only considers formal and legally 
recognized land deals, thus excluding informal or illegal occupation of land. At last it excludes land 
acquisitions of hundreds hectares, which are not insignificant at the village scale. 
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In the present document, we will consider land grabbing in a broader definition, as the action to seize land 
that was legitimately occupied or used by a third party. We acknowledge that land uses are not always 
visible (long fallows in slash-and-burn systems or nomadic pastoralism, cultural or religious purposes, 
natural forests used for hunting and gathering) but are not less legitimate for this. We do not include scale 
in this definition, considering that losing a single hectar of land might be sufficient to endanger the 
livelihood of a farming family. We acknowledge that land acquisitions and specifically large-scale land 
acquisitions, do not always involve land grab. 
Land grabbing is a social concept. It deals with social and cultural use of and access to land, and with land 
tenure, including customary and legal rights. If we accept this definition, land grabbing cannot apply to a 
piece of land free of legitimate claims. However, projects associated with large-scale deforestation are 
often qualified as land grabs, without any reference to the social characteristics of the land and the 
project. But the misuse of the concept might be counterproductive. Some projects must be condemned for 
their irresponsible environmental behaviour, others for their inequity, unfair deals proposed to local 
communities or even violence to keep control over the land. Fortunately, some agribusiness companies 
are actually acting responsibly to the benefit of numerous actors: the company of course, the State, and 
their employees. How can large-scale land acquisitions be evaluated within the land grab framework?  
 
METHOD 
In this study we analyse agribusiness companies with land lease or land ownership above 1000 ha in 
Cameroon, Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Republic of Congo (RC). Other categories 
of actors are involved in large-scale land acquisitions and might be suspected of land grab, such as 
cooperatives of foreign farmers (see Boche and Anseeuw 2013), companies from other sectors of activity 
(e.g. extractive mining), governments (to develop projects of public interest like infrastructure or 
conservation) or Non-Government Organization (claiming land for conservation or Carbon stock). We do 
not consider them in this paper, even though we acknowledge their importance in the global discussion on 
land grab. 
Several indicators were selected and applied to agro-industrial plantations dating from 2000. These 
indicators include, but are not limited to, historical occupation of land, customary rights, legal land tenure 
status, Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), shared book of requirement following FPIC signature, 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA).  
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On a limited sample of industrial plantations dating from 2000, spatial analysis was used to observe land 
occupation prior to its allocation to an agribusiness company in and around agro-industrial concessions. 
The analysis draws on scientific literature and media reports review and on field surveys conducted in 
2012 and 2013 in the 4 countries where key stakeholders have been interviewed (representatives of the 
various ministries involved in large-scale land deals, managers of the private sector presently investing in 
land-based projects, plantation managers, NGOs, land and tenure experts, villagers nearby on-going land-
based projects). Key documents were consulted and gathered during these surveys (legal documentation, 
FPIC, book of requirements, reports of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment). 
 
RESULTS 
LAND GRABBING 
Land grabbing in the literature often refers to the ‘global rush for farmland’ that began in the early 2000 
and was amplified after the 2007 and 2008 hikes of food prices (Deininger et al. 2011; Cotula et al. 2009; 
Cotula 2012). The phenomenon involves agribusiness companies, governments seeking food security for 
their people abroad, and private wealth funds looking for interesting returns through speculation on land 
(Boche and Anseeuw 2013).  
Attribution of land to agribusiness activities answers to political strategies to diversify national economic 
resources (this is the case of Gabon), to populate national border areas and unify the population through 
agricultural development (e.g. Indonesia and Brazil), to boost the national economy and balance import-
export of food products. This last objective is announced as a priority in national strategies of the 
countries of Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, RC, DRC). 
Hall (2012) indicates the increasing participation of regional economic powers in large-scale farmland 
deals, with especially South Africa in Africa, and Brazil in Latin America. In Central Africa agribusiness 
companies are supported in majority by European, Asian and domestic financial capital (Feintrenie 2014). 
South Africa is only represented by a cooperative of South-African farmers in the Republic of Congo (see 
Boche and Anseeuw 2013 and Feintrenie 2014). More than half of the agribusiness companies installed in 
the Central African region have created local enterprises partly secured by domestic capital, most often 
from the hosting State (Feintrenie 2014), which is coherent with the analysis by Hall (2012). This fact 
illustrates the role of national governments in the development of industrial activities. Agribusiness 
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companies need the support of governments for the establishment of an estate, not only at national level, 
but also locally (Hall 2011). Access to land is bound by the legal and customary ties of the national and 
local land tenure systems. 
 
LAND TENURE 
The legal land tenure regimes in Central Africa were inherited from the colonial period, and are based on 
the European models (summarized in table 1). In Cameroon and the RC, customary rights on land can be 
recognized through a process of entitlement to access individual land ownership. Only effectively 
occupied land is lawful (see Wily 2012 for Cameroon, quoting the Land Tenure Ordinance 1/1974 and the 
State Lands Ordinance 2/1974; see Law 10-2004 in the RC). Common lands under customary tenure 
system are not recognized in Cameroon. Co-ownership is recognized in the RC and in Cameroon. The 
process to acquire individual land tenure titles might be difficult, and is limited to 100 ha in the RC (but 
exceptions might be granted by the Minister of Land Affairs see Decree 2006-255 of 28
th
 June 2006). 
In Cameroon (see Mope Simo 2011), the RC as well as the DRC, customary chiefs are recognized by the 
official administration, and have great power over land. Customary chiefs are designated within a family 
accepted as the heir of authority over land, passed down through many generations, and based on the 
principle of primary occupation of the land. In DRC this inheritance follows either a matrilineal or a 
patrilineal transmission, depending on the ethnic groups. Masters of the land have the responsibility to 
manage the land for the common good of their people. They can grant access to a plot of land for a 
specific use to local people as well as to foreigners. For local people, customary land use right is 
transmissible by inheritance. 
In the DRC land tenure is only secure if it is recognized by both the national legal land tenure system and 
the customary land tenure system. Both systems are legitimate and can lead to claims over land in court 
(see the DRC Constitution of 2006). This double land tenure system generates many conflicts, and 
discussion on land tenure reforms have been going on since the 2006 Constitution was put in place. 
In Gabon, customary rights are recognized only as individual use rights (collective rights are not 
acknowledged), but the Gabonese State remains the ultimate land owner. The right to individual or 
common property is not recognized in the Gabonese legislation (Wily 2012). Individual land use rights 
can be entitled as ‘permits to occupy’. This is an inheritance from the colonial period that defined the 
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State as the custodian of the land and recognized only the rights of use to individuals (Ndjimbi 2013). The 
reaffirmation of customary rights over land could only be done within the revision of the current 
regulations, based on an interpretation of international agreements or supranational laws.  
 National Domain Private domain Public domain 
Cameroon 
1) National domain: 
including permanent 
forest domain 
Private domain 
Public domain: 
including non-
permanent forest 
domain 
2) yes yes Inalienable 
Gabon 
1) Permanent State 
Domain: including 
productive state 
forests recorded 
(forests and forest 
reserves allocated to 
production) 
Private domain: 
including the forestry 
rural area (land and 
forests whose 
enjoyment is reserved 
for village 
communities) 
Public domain: 
including classified 
state forests with 
conservation value, 
and protected areas 
2) Only land use right Only land use right 
Exceptionally: land 
use right 
Republic of 
Congo 
1) Private domain: of the 
State, of decentralized 
collectivities, of public 
bodies 
Private land patrimony 
Public domain: 
including land and 
properties of public 
utility, natural and 
artificial 
2) Yes Yes Inalienable 
 
Table 1: Main land tenure categories and their characteristics: 1) name in the national legislation, 
2) can customary rights over land be claimed, be they individual or commons? 
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ACCESS TO LAND LEASE FOR AGRIBUSINESS IN CENTRAL AFRICA 
To be authorized to develop an industrial plantation, agribusiness companies are required to follow a step 
by step procedure. Agribusiness companies can be entitled land leases on the national domain, for 
renewable periods of 18 to 99 years. Figure 1 summarizes the procedure in Cameroon, which is 
representative of what is required in the other countries of the region. In Cameroon, land deals of more 
than 50 ha require a Presidential Decree. In the RC, this limit is at 100 ha. The procedure requires the 
consultation of representatives of the local population by the land titling committee.  
At this stage, an ESIA is also required, to assess future impacts and submit proposals of mitigation or 
compensation to the local population and the regional authorities. Claims over land can be made to the 
committee. If proper land titles are owned by individuals, they can either sell their land to the State who 
further leases it to the company, or benefit from compensation. In rare cases they might be granted the 
right to keep their land for their own interest. 
 
 
 
ESIA 
Regular assessment of 
ecological impacts 
FPIC 
Regular assessment of 
social impacts 
Cameroon Yes Yes No No 
Republic of Congo Yes Yes No No 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Yes No No No 
Gabon Yes Yes No No 
 
Table 2: Compulsory procedures for industrial plantations in Central Africa (source: Feintrenie 
2014) 
These national procedures have been developed by governments to limit risks of land grabbing and 
negative impacts on the environment and the population by large-scale land acquisitions. These usually 
involve ESIA conducted either by independent consultants or by public officers (or the two together), 
followed by operational plans of impact management (table 2). Most often these ESIA are reduced to 
their environmental part, social impact being reduced to some public consultations to register the 
participants’ comments on a presentation of the ESIA. Once the land lease is settled, laws require regular 
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control (annual or biannual) of the impact on the environment by the responsible public service, which 
also check if the enterprise is standing by the commitments made in the management plan. 
 
Figure 1: Process to be followed by agribusiness companies to acquire land leases in Cameroon 
(adapted from Iyabano 2013, based on MINDAF 2008) 
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AGRIBUSINESS COMPANIES AND LAND GRABS IN CENTRAL AFRICA 
Feintrenie (2014) relates the historical development of agro industrial plantations in Central Africa, and 
recent changes. The preferred agribusiness commodities in the region in 2013 are palm oil, rubber, banana 
(plantain and dessert), and sugar cane. Sugar cane is dominated by SOMDIAA, a subsidiary of the French 
Castel and Vilgrain group with three companies in Cameroon, the RC and Gabon. The Compagnie 
Sucrière du Kwilu, joint-venture between a Belgium company and the Congolese State, manages a fourth 
sugar cane plantation in the DRC. Most of the companies owning oil palm plantations also run rubber 
plantations, and some banana plantations (especially in Cameroon). Palm oil and rubber production are 
dominated by European funds (Socfin with the Socapalm/Safacam plantations in Cameroon and Brabanta 
in the DRC, affiliated to the French Bolloré group; the Group Blattner Elwyn in DRC, the Nocafex 
company in DRC; and SIAT in Gabon). Asian multinationals are present with Olam-International owning 
Olam-Gabon a joint-venture with the State, GMG investing in Gabon (shares of SIAT) and in Cameroon 
(Hevecam and Sud-Cameroun, two rubber companies), Siva in Cameroon (Biopalm), and Atama and 
Lexus Agric in the RC. 
Land leases signed since 2008 concern larger areas than before (Feintrenie 2014) and mainly concern oil 
palm or rubber plantations. In the DRC land leases always rely on the sale of a public agricultural 
company, inheritance legacy that goes back to the 1910s. However land leases might involve expanding 
former plantations (this is the case for at least one plantation). This is also the case in the RC, where Eco-
oil Energy acquired in November 2013 the public companies SanghaPalm and RNPC (Régie Nationale 
des Palmeraies du Congo) with a mandate to replant and expand oil palm plantations.  
 
Table 3: Procedures followed by industrial plantations installed since 2000 in Central Africa 
(adapted from Feintrenie 2014) 
 
Industrial 
plantations 
New plantations 
since 2000 
ESIA conducted 
after 2000 
FPIC signed after 
2000 
Cameroon 18 3 1 0 
RC 12 5 5 1 
DRC 15 1 1 0 
Gabon 12 4 3 3 
Total 58 13 11 4 
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The largest land lease in the RC is the Atama plantation, which is developed on unclassified land and 
declassified forest, and not on any former plantation. In Cameroon, 3 new land leases have been granted 
since 2000, including the controversial case of Herakles Farms (SG-SOC). They target rubber and palm 
oil production. In Gabon, Olam is also developing new plantations, mostly on natural forests classified as 
degraded by the State. Table 3 indicates the number of new plantations that have benefited from prior 
ESIA and FPIC since 2000 at the time this paper is written (February 2014). It clearly shows that ESIA 
are more or less systematically conducted (some plantations in the table are counted as not having 
followed ESIA, but have announced under-going ESIA), but FPIC remains an exception. As FPIC is not 
required by law, it is up to the corporate responsibility policy of the company to decide to engage in this 
negotiation with the impacted population. 
In Gabon, both Olam and SIAT (on the expansion of existing plantations) are following the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) principles and criteria before planting oil palm, and also apply similar 
management to their rubber plantations. This approach includes to follow a FPIC negotiation process with 
all the impacted communities, and to locate High Conservation Value (HCV) areas in order to conserve 
them. As a result of the FPIC and HCV assessment Olam-Gabon has excluded part of the land proposed 
by the Gabonese government from the concession. This was facilitated by the prior agreement between 
Olam-Gabon and the State on the final surface area to be allocated to develop oil palm and rubber 
plantations (100 000 ha for each commodity), without prior decision on the location. This agreement 
means that taking into account demands of exclusion from potentially impacted villages, and conservation 
of HCV do not endanger the business plan of the company, as long as the total planted area is secured.  
 
FPIC might also be useful while replanting former plantations. GBE encountered some social claims on 
land while replanting rubber in the Bas-Congo province of the DRC. To solve the problem and restore 
social peace, the company engaged into discussions with each village close to the plantations, under the 
district supervision. They reach agreements and signed protocols of agreement that include some 
commitments by the company regarding social help, annual customary presents to the chiefs, and most 
often restitution of a portion of land to the village. Only one village has opposed the process and went to 
court to claim the villagers’ rights on the abandoned plantation. The villagers lost in court, and the case is 
still unsolved on the ground. 
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New plantations 
since 2000 
Plantations checked 
Land uses observed 
before 2000 
Cameroon 3 3 1 
RC 5 2 2 
DRC 1 1 1 
Gabon 4 2 1 
Total 13 8 5 
Table 4: Land uses observed before 2000 in the location of new agro-industrial plantations (source: 
field data collected in 2012 and 2013 and spatial analysis) 
Table 4 summarizes some results from spatial analysis regarding agricultural plots or habitat prior to land 
allocation to an agribusiness company. The method used is quite simple: having the shape of the 
concession and its date of installation, we searched for satellite images of the area of the concession prior 
to this date. The human activities found on the image informed on the human presence prior to the land 
attribution for agribusiness purpose. This method is not appropriate for land uses like bush fallows in 
swidden systems or nomadic pastoralism, cultural or religious purpose, natural forests used for hunting 
and gathering. It is only one indicator that needs to be completed by historical surveys of land uses by 
local people. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the research of human presence before 2000, example of the land lease of 
the Atama oil palm plantation in the Republic of Congo (source: Rainforest foundation 2013 and 
Google Earth) 
Owando 
Ombélé 
Date of image : 25/6/2005 
Date of image : 
2012 
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On the first satellite image (Figure 2) one can see the small town of Owando, just at the border of the 
Atama concession and the small village of Ombélé inside the concession. On the second picture dated 
June 2005, from the Google Earth archive images, one can see the Ombélé village and a laterite track. 
These images show that the land was occupied on some part of the concession allocated to Atama. 
An agribusiness company can be blamed for land grabbing if there is acknowledged human presence or 
recognized non-visible land uses prior to the land allocation, no proper FPIC obtained, social claims 
clearly stated over the land during the ESIA and not taken into account. Based on this definition, there 
was a clear case of land grabbing in Cameroon by Herakles Farms in 2009, when about 73 000 ha were 
allocated for 99 years to the company by a convention signed with the Ministry of Economy and Land 
Settlement in 2009. The lease was downsized in 2013 to about 19 000 ha for 3 years renewable according 
to results. 
Olam-Gabon and Atama were also accused of land grabbing (Rainforest foundation 2013). However, 
there is no proof so far that this was the case. Olam-Gabon has given back land to the villages where no 
agreement was reached during the FPIC process; these villages will not be impacted by the plantations of 
the company. Atama plantation is located in an area with very few villages. No proper FPIC process was 
followed, but public consultations were conducted and no statement of rejection of the project by the 
impacted population appeared in the ESIA reports. Villagers interviewed during the field visits in 2012 
and 2014 were happy with the project from which they were expecting lots of employment. These two 
companies will for sure have an impact on natural forest and biodiversity, but this is not a matter of land 
grab. 
 
LAND GRABBING BY ELITES 
While the media’s attention focusses on large scale land grabs, the widespread phenomenon of land 
acquisition by national elites has nearly been overlooked. In many developing countries, for the last 20 
years urban elites have been reinvesting in agricultural activities in their village or area of origin. In 
Central Africa as a whole and especially in Cameroon, this move gained momentum in the early 1990s 
with the structural adjustment plans and the devaluation of the CFA Franc. As urban investments lost 
their attractiveness because of the crisis and as most agricultural commodity prices were plummeting, 
palm oil prices were experiencing a strong increase locally and worldwide. This prompted urban elites 
originating from the Cameroonian oil palm belt to massively invest in the development of the sector. 
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According to a recent census of non-industrial oil palm plantations (Ngom et al. 2014), 10% of oil palm 
planters own two thirds of the total, which represents more than the area under agro-industrial plantations 
(60,000 ha). Most of these planters are urbanized elites with plantations of 10 ha up to a thousand hectare 
or more. The largest of these plantations is in the South Region, outside of the traditional oil palm belt. 
There, mostly high ranking civil servants developed large estates equipped with their own milling facility. 
The reasons usually put forward to justify such investment are economic: diversification of income, 
preparing for retirement, securing land ownership for the next generation. 
This investment of elites in farmland does not systematically conclude in land grab as defined above. 
Elites might invest in free land, and respect the will of the local population, which are often family 
relatives. The specific case of elites with customary authority on land is more problematic. As it is 
described in the first part of this paper, customary land chiefs are responsible for the sustainable 
management of the village (or group) territory. They do not individually own the land, neither according 
to the legal tenure system nor to the customary one. Examples of land chiefs who seize the land under 
their responsibility for their own and private interest exist in all the countries of the region. Mope Simo 
(2011) analyzed some cases in Cameroun; the Novacel Company in DRC used land acquired through the 
use of this customary authority over land to land titles. Projects developed this way claim to be managed 
in the benefit of the local communities, create employment, develop and maintain public infrastructure, 
and provide social care (see Ndjogui and Levang, 2013). The same arguments used by agribusiness, 
forestry or extractives companies when their activities are put under question. Facts remain that the 
responsibilities of a land chief has been diverted for private interest, and that local people and future 
generations have lost access to customary lands. Customary chiefs are very powerful among their 
assignees, who rarely openly complain about them. They rely on their chiefs’ decisions regarding land, 
with trust, or at least with the strong believe that they have a legitimate right to alienate customary land. 
The chiefs’ responsibilities are proportional to the trust of their people. 
 
DISCUSSION 
HOW TO ASSESS LAND GRAB? 
As stated above a case of land grabbing might be concluded if there is acknowledged human presence or 
recognized non-visible land uses prior to the land allocation, no proper FPIC followed, social claims 
clearly stated over the land during the ESIA and not taken into account when the limits in time and space 
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of the land lease are defined. Thus, assessing a case of land grab means assessing prior land use or land 
occupation, assessing the realization and quality of ESIA and FPIC, and the way the claims of the 
impacted population or their refusal of the project have been considered, commitments taken by 
stakeholders and later on respected.  
ESIA might easily be controlled through a second assessment by a neutral counter-part. FPIC is more 
difficult to assess subsequently, but the method applied and the time allocated to the process might be 
used as indicators of the quality of the FPIC. 
It is difficult to conduct a proper FPIC process in remote areas and with populations who are not used to 
think on the long term and to formulate claims. It takes time to make sure people clearly understand what 
is at stake, what might be the impact at short, medium and long term, of an agribusiness plantation. 
Living ‘lost’ in a forest or open-space savannah, it is difficult to imagine that in 20 years, a small city 
might have grown to welcome the employees of the agribusiness company and their families (see 
projections of Atama and Olam-Gabon regarding employment in Feintrenie 2014). One might even dream 
of this city in the forest or savannah (see the Indonesian example of the Punan in Levang et al. 2005) not 
thinking of the competition on bush meat, land for food crops, and water that will come with it. Specific 
methods can be used to help this prospective exercise, such as the Participatory Prospective Analysis 
(Bourgeois and Jesus 2004). 
Negotiations on compensations, or on the conditions of a partnership between local farmers and a 
company, are also not easy to moderate in a balance manner. Big numbers, interest rates, financial or 
accounting vocabulary as well as juridical terms, are unknown to most of family farmers and hunters and 
gatherers. It is easy to manipulate the population by using specialized terminology, or jargon, and get 
them lost. The moderator of discussions being paid either by the company or by the public authorities will 
do his/her best to reach an agreement. A proper FPIC needs to ensure that all the categories of impacted 
people feel free to speak, with no regards to thei power relations (see Hall 2011 on the power relations at 
stake regarding control over land), which might requires the use of specific methods and tools (such as 
role playing games). Regular control of environmental and social impacts and what is done to mitigate 
them must be conducted, to ensure the commitments taken by all the parties are respected. 
Another major difficulty in assessing land grab cases might come from unclear land tenure system and the 
absence of a unique cadaster covering all the sectors of activities (agriculture, forestry, conservation, 
extractive mining, etc.). Where the status of a land is not clear, or is different within the customary and 
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the legal tenure systems, it is difficult to estimate whether claims are legitimate or not. Customary claims 
are not always grounded; some local people or chiefs do not hesitate to invent new traditions and land 
uses if it can bring on higher compensations.  
The last challenge is the consideration of timeframe. A lot of agribusiness companies are presently 
investing in replanting old plantations, which often date back to the colonial period, especially in the DRC 
where a lot of such plantations had been developed under the Belgium authority. These plantations have 
been by time public or private owned. Legally they are part of the Private State Domain. They have been 
abandoned for 10 to 40 years, and some of them have been harvested or converted to food crops by the 
local population, especially where the pressure on land has increased with the population. In the legal 
tenure system, they are the State property. But if the first land allocation has been done through land grab, 
should local people’s claims on the land be considered as legitimate? 
This legacy from the past is also a lesson for the future. If land allocation is legitimated and accepted by 
all the stakeholders at a moment in time, what does ensure it will be recognized by the future generations? 
In Indonesia, large-scale plantations that were developed within partnership schemes between companies 
and farmers presently face this issue of second and third generations. Land and employment are not 
sufficient to respond to the demand of children and grand-children of those who signed the deal. This 
situation can turn into violent conflicts over land. 
The only manner to limit such situations is to develop a land use plan at national or provincial level, with 
work on strategic solutions to provide future generations with livelihoods opportunities. Prospective 
exercises should be conducted by public decision makers at a regular frequency, and the land use plan be 
revised to be adapted to scenarios of possible futures. A land use plan is also a good tool to prevent 
allocation of unscrupulous large land. It might be useful to include within the legal framework specific 
requirement to go to certain additional processes if a proposed land allocation is against the original land 
use plan. 
 
ELITES AND LAND GRAB 
The social prestige linked to the ownership of a large estate in his home village cannot be underestimated 
especially if the elite has political ambitions in his constituency. All elites claim that they are bringing 
development to their village, providing employment, and better lives for their brothers (Ndjogui and 
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Levang, 2013). The local reality differs somehow from this idyllic vision. In Cameroon, absentee 
landlords face huge problems to find efficient and honest managers, local people usually refuse to work as 
day-labourers for the elite and most jobs are taken up by migrants. Resenting that their land was taken 
away (even if they were compensated) villagers don’t hesitate to harvest the oil palm fruits for their own 
benefit. Embezzlement and theft are the rule. As a result very few estates prove economically viable. But 
this doesn’t prevent more elites from entering the oil palm sector in Cameroon, an observation inciting to 
conclude that for high ranking civil servants money laundering comes before profitable business creation 
(Sevestre, 2013). However, locally the overall perception by villagers is rather positive, thanks to the elite 
the economic situation in the village has improved, new opportunities and infrastructures are available, 
and “we don’t need to buy oil anymore”.   
Hall (2011) also reports land grabbing by smallholders in Asia, in answer to dynamics of expansion of 
cash crops during high prices periods. There also local elites use their positions of customary power, or 
their connection with state authority, to gain control over land (Hall 2011).  
In villages where land used to have no economic value the coming of a project of plantation creates a new 
market, a land market. Some farmers might then become land brokers, buying land at low value, 
expecting the price to rise, they speculate on land in the same ways as wealth funds (personal observation 
in Indonesia in 2013). Hall (2011) analyzed this phenomenon also within migrants’ communities, with 
migrant land brokers acquiring land to sell to the next wave of migrants. 
Farmers do use their land sustainably if they are sure to keep their access to it, and to be able to hand it 
over to their children or heirs. Security of access to land is a condition to sustainable practices. Matrilineal 
systems of inheritance ensure a conservation of the patrimony through decisions to be taken in common 
with the assignees of lands and properties (this is the case of the Minangkabau group in West Sumatra 
province in Indonesia). But when the family links are broken up, the user of a land might be detached to 
his successor on this land, and might manage it in the most valuable way on the short term, rather than 
sustainably (case observed in the DRC, in the Plateaux Batéké). This phenomenon is amplified when 
dealing with commons and customary chief of common lands. The new generation of heirs of land chiefs 
in the DRC has often benefited from high education in cities, and might not feel close to their village. 
When this is the case, they might either disregard the legacy and leave the villagers to themselves, or 
consider using the land to serve their personal interest. Their predecessor might foresee this, and exploit 
the land in an intensive way during the time they have left. 
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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS REGARDING LAND GRAB BY AGRIBUSINESS COMPANIES 
The lack of transparency on land allocation to agribusiness companies conducts to media reports of land 
deals that are not concluded, and sometimes with exaggerated figures. In the DRC, media reported a 
project of 1 million ha, that has actually been under discussion for 100 000 ha, ten times less. This deal 
was never signed. Similar cases are reported in all the countries. Feintrenie (2014) estimated to more than 
1.8 million hectares the surface area that was supposed to be allocated to agribusiness companies but that 
did not concluded into the signature of a land lease in the four studied countries (Cameroon, Gabon, DRC 
and RC). 
The governments of Central Africa are presently learning from experience. The wave of investors’ 
demands for farmland since 2004 has taken them unprepared. They had to adapt their legislation, take 
decisions under pressure to avoid losing an economic opportunity to the benefit of their neighbors 
(Feintrenie 2013). In Cameroon, the fiasco of Herakles Farms stimulated the elaboration of a national 
strategy for the sustainable development of oil palm by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. This strategy is being developed with the support of a working group including all kind of 
stakeholders (representatives of Ministries, oil palm companies, oil palm smallholders, NGOs, civil 
society, academics). This approach and the discussions that have been generated among these participants 
to the working group, have led the Ministry to the decision to limit large-scale industrial plantations, and 
to favor smallholders’ plantation development in the oil palm sector. 
Inclusive schemes based on partnership between agribusiness companies and smallholders might be a 
good answer to economic development needs both at local and national scales. Examples abound of 
successful partnerships and farmers asking for them in very different contexts from Caribbean and Latin 
America (Borras et al. 2012), to Indonesia (Feintrenie et al. 2010), or Ukraine (Mamonova 2012). But the 
conditions of partnerships must be adapted to the local context, schemes that work in Indonesia might fell 
in Cameroon, as it has been shown for the Nucleus Estate and Smallholders type of partnership in the oil 
palm sector (Nkhongho et al 2014). 
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The Land Observatory of Cameroon, coordinated by the Foundation Paul Ango Ela (FPAE) considers 
three factors that must be in place to avoid land grabbing in the process of land allocation: 
1. The purpose of the demand must be clearly defined, economic sector, production, targets. 
Each purpose should enter a specific framework of evaluation by the public services, 
including evaluation of business plan, impacts, costs and benefits for the State and for the 
local population. 
2. Each category of impacted population must be properly addressed by the ESIA and included 
in the FPIC process. Special care should be taken to make sure ethnic minorities and women 
had an actual possibility to participate in the process and freely express their opinions and 
claims. 
3. Land tenure must follow clear rules, with inclusive cadaster. 
 
International guidelines have been proposed to help the States managing investments in land and natural 
resources, such as the Voluntary Guidelines for Responsible Governance of tenure (FAO 2012) which 
“are intended to contribute to the global and national efforts towards the eradication of hunger and 
poverty, based on the principles of sustainable development and with the recognition of the centrality of 
land to development by promoting secure tenure rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and 
forests.”(FAO 2012).  
The FAO also proposed Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) principles (FAO et al 2010). The 
OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises (OECD 2008) were amended on 25 May 2011 by the 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (OECD-FAO 2011) to include the 
RAI principles. The International Finance Corporation also developed some performance standard in 
respect of land acquisition and involuntary resettlement (IFC 2006; IFC 2012). All these guidelines and 
principles might help Central African governments to put in place procedures to welcome and manage 
investments by agribusiness companies for the better of their countries and peoples. 
 
In November 2013, the Pan-African Parliament and the Parliament of the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) met in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in a parliamentary seminar 
on agricultural investments in Africa. In their final declaration they stated: 
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“We do hereby request that: […] 
2. Member States improve transparency on the process of acquiring and distributing arable land; 
3. Member States include farmers, indigenous people and women, directly in decision making related 
to land transactions; […] 
8.  Member States promote transparent negotiation processes and access to contracts on land 
investments by publishing them in the official gazette.” 
 
This declaration supports the conclusion of our analysis, that transparency and participatory process of 
decision-making on the allocation of land are keys to avoid land grabbing and get the best from 
agricultural investments in farmland. 
 
CONCLUSION 
So far the only case of land grabbing by an agribusiness company in the four studied countries – 
Cameroon, Gabon, the RC and the DRC - that is not questionable is the Herakles-Farms plantation project 
in Cameroon. This conclusion does not mean that this is the only case of land grab, since we have not 
analyzed cases outside agribusiness companies. This result is a positive sign that show either that most of 
the agribusiness companies investing in the region have good social corporate responsibility policies or 
that the governments are careful in their land allocations to such companies, or maybe both.  
Whatever the reason, there are still weaknesses in the land allocation procedures, such as the lack of 
unique cadaster in some countries, unclear and controversial land tenure systems that allow conflicts over 
land to rise and not be solved, absence of FPIC and of regular control of social impacts in the evaluation 
of agribusiness projects. Transparency of the land allocation process is also missing, and this might lead 
to land grabbing or unfair accusations of land grab. Several international guidelines exist that could 
support national government in the design of adequate procedure of land allocation. 
If agribusiness companies in Central Africa have so far not participated much in land grabbing, they 
represent a threat to the environment where they are located large-scale land concessions in forested 
areas, and nearby protected areas. Besides the direct impact of deforestation, which might be limited in 
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some cases to degraded forest, the demographic pressure that will be generated by their call for labor will 
threaten wild life, generate pollutions, and most probably provoke additional deforestation.  
Agribusiness companies are not the only possible responsible of land grab. Elites are major actors in this 
domain as they invest in hundreds and thousands of hectares of farmland. They are less easy to control or 
even to observe, being broadly spread in the countries and benefiting from strong local social ties. They 
might use their customary authority or their closeness to public authorities to secure their access to land. 
They do not always look for direct profit but might secure land for a later stage, like their retirement. 
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